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Shoah Resource Center, The International School for Holocaust Studies 50 / 13 simple. At first glance it seems that the Soviet restriction applied only to the members of the other ethnic groups resident in the annexed territories on the date that Soviet citizenship was conferred on all the residents of these territories; as for the Poles in the annexed territories, they too had become Soviet citizens but the Soviets claimed that they were showing exceptional lenience and making an extraordinary gesture in allowing them to be recruited for the Polish Armed Forces. Consent to this restriction was tantamount to indirect recognition of the Soviet annexation of Polish territory, and to this the Poles were, of course, vociferously opposed. The Soviet-imposed restriction thus put the Poles in a quandary, and it is against this background that one should view the anxious questioning by the various Polish authorities concerning the precise meaning of the restriction. It was perhaps not by chance that the Soviets chose the matter of the recruiting for the Polish Armed Forces as a means to undermine the jurisdiction of the Poles over certain categories of Polish citizens living in the occupied territories. It is reasonable to assume that the idea of excluding Jews and other minority groups was broached only after Sikorski and Anders had voiced their anti-Jewish comments in the presence of Stalin and after they had revealed their intentions of disqualifying the Jews as being unfit for "our Army." An episode that occurred the day after the conversation with Stalin, at -a-dinner given by Stalin at the Kremlin in honor of Sikorski and his aides, is most revealing.
Sikorski again raised the issue of the release of pri-soners-of-war from Soviet "labour divisions" and complained that the process was too slow and not sufficiently comprehensive. Anders then remarked that he had been officially informed that Byelorussians, Ukrainians and Jews would not be released at all. "Were they not Polish citizens?" he asked in anger. "They have never ceased in fact to be Polish citizens, because your agreements with Germany have been annulled." Stalin then replied, all the while ignoring the basic question that Anders had raised: "What do you need Byelorussians, Ukrainians and Jews for? It is Poles you need, they are the best soldiers."
There was another fundamental question of great concern which became a subject of dispute between the Soviet and Polish authorities. In the eyes of Soviet law, the residents of the annexed territories were regarded as Soviet __________________________________________________________________________ Shoah Resource Center, The International School for Holocaust Studies
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citizens, but according to the agreement signed between the Soviets and the Poles these residents were Polish citizens. This ambiguity led of necessity to friction. On November 10, 1941, Kot lodged a complaint with the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs that attempts had been made in Kazakhstan to conscript Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Jews into the Red Army, despite the fact that they were Polish citizens and not subject to conscription; he also complained that Polish citizens who were not ethnic Poles were being prevented from reaching the recruiting centers of the Polish Armed Forces. In the Ministry's response of December 1, the Soviets attempted to present their interpretation of the Soviet-Polish Agreements in a manner which would not seem to run counter to the legislation turning residents of the annexed territories into Soviet citizens. The recognition of the Polish citizenship of ethnic Poles residing in the eastern territories "shows the good will and readiness to compromise of the Soviet Government, but can in no case serve as a basis for the analogous recognition as Polish citizens of persons of other nationalities, in particular, Ukrainian, White Russian and Jewish." The response did not however refer in any way to the right of the ethnic groups in the eastern territories to enlist in the Polish Armed Forces. Naturally, the status assigned to Jewish nationality or religion in this context raises pointed questions concerning the attitudes of the Soviet regime and Communist ideology; however, as in so many other cases, here too pragmatic political interests took precedence over ideological principles. The Polish Embassy rejected both the claim and the interpretation of the agreement as made by the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Kot explained that from the Polish standpoint all citizens, regardless of ethnic origin or race, enjoyed equal rights, and this equality applied both to the amnesty being granted and to the privilege of enlisting in the Polish Armed Forces. Polish law did not discriminate among its citizens, and the military agreement granted every Polish citizen the right to enlist in the Polish Armed Forces. On January 5, 1942, the Soviet Foreign Ministry replied that after studying the arguments put forward by the Polish Embassy with regard to the different categories of citizens, it saw no reason to modify its position. It continued in a lengthy paragraph "explaining" the distinction between "occupation" and the "entry" of Soviet
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soldiers into the eastern territories of Poland; the gist of the claim was that the annexation of the territories was carried out "as the result of the freely expressed will of the population of those districts." This correspondence between the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Polish Embassy was preceded by an announcement by military circles to the effect that certain categories of citizens were not to be recruited; no protest is known to have been lodged either by military or civilian elements in the Polish camp against the Soviet restrictions imposed in the military sector. Kot empha-zises that in the discussion with Stalin of March 18, 1942, Anders did not even hint at the issue of the restrictions on the recruiting of the national minorities.
The documentary evidence and eye-witness accounts indicate that the Soviet authorities did not as a general rule actively interfere in the recruiting process, and they did not enforce rigid adherence to the regulations stipulating rejection of certain of the national minorities. Soviet representatives did sit on the recruiting committees, but only on very rare occasions would they investigate the ethnic background of the potential recruit;
for the most part they refrained from taking an active role in the work of the committees.
One phenomenon which did concern the Russians to the extent of an angry 
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Byelorussian or Ukrainian. Panfilov closes with the request that he be informed as soon as possible of the hand-over so that these men may be brought to trial. The letter apparently refers to individuals who had fled from the "work units." Residents of the "western territories" (zapadniki), particularly Ukrainians, were considered to be too unreliable an element to be posted to the front, and they were therefore chanelled to conscripted work units. We indeed know of Jews escaping from these units, which were subject to the harshest of conditions, and fleeing to recruiting centers of the Polish Armed There is no basis, of course, for Anders' claim that Alter and Ehrlich had originated the idea of separate Jewish units and that under his influence had been induced to abandon the proposal. Kot in his book deliberately points out every false step made by his rival Anders; in this respect he notes that the General's comments on Alter and Ehrlich "do not, of course, conform to the truth." There are however no grounds for assuming that Anders was wilfully misleading; he was probably just mistaken. Totally lacking as he was in understanding of the postures and ideological variations among the main blocs in Jewish public life in Poland, he could easily have attributed to the Bund leaders a stance that was actually quite unthinkable for them. We can however safely assume that Anders' claim that he had contact with Alter and Ehrlich was not pure fabrication. In his book Anders praises the leaders of the __________________________________________________________________________ Shoah Resource Center, The International School for Holocaust Studies
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Bund as loyal patriots of the Polish homeland, while in a note not meant for publication, he prides himself on having thrown these two leaders out of his office. It seems that Alter and Ehrlich were trying to have tension between the Jews and the Poles in the Armed Forces reduced, and in this connection offered several proposals for Anders' consideration. Anders must have confused this intercession with the proposal to set up a a separate unit, and it was thus that he came to pen the incorrect version of the facts quoted above. claim for external consumption, but on the inside, no one should expect me to believe that it was a forgery."
The Prime Minister remained silent and after a while said: "I will deal with this matter also."
It is clear that anti-Semitism was a general feature of the Polish Armed Forces; it had its roots in traditions of the past and in the ideology and political conceptions of Poland in the period between the wars. The various strata in Polish society were not sufficiently perspicacious to study their own history with a critical eye, nor were they able to perceive just how destructive a role anti-Semitism played in the internal life of the Polish republic and how it had The political leadership, however, was sensitive to the harmful ramifications of anti-Semitism and it did show an understandable degree of awareness to the negative reactions to the Polish hatred of Jews, by public opinion in the free countries and by influential Jewish circles in the West. However, since their attitude to the issue was ambivalent and was dictated by a whole array of tactical considerations, it is not surprising that periodic "cracks" in their behavior and pronouncements showed up their true feelings. It should also not .be forgotten that the Endeks, who enjoyed a position of respect within the broad-based coalition in London, held Jew-hatred as one of the fundamental elements in their ideological and political outlook. And as we have also seen, anti-Semitism was particularly rampant among the officers of the Armed Forces, and this attitude undoubtedly had its reverberations within the ranks as well.
The Evacuation of the Armed Forces of General Anders
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The total evacuation of General Anders' Armed Forces from the Soviet Union was the outcome of the tensions and suspicions that accompanied all dealings between the Poles and the Soviet authorities. The evacuation was also in no small part a product of the differences of opinion and the rivalries that existed among the Poles themselves. According to the operative agreement signed by both the Polish and the Soviet generals, the Poles were to train the recruits in stages, send them into action in units no smaller than a division, and be subordinate to the Supreme Soviet Command. The Polish generals were possibly not fully aware of the significance of the commitments inherent in the agreement. At any rate, the various political and military echelons of the Polish leadership sought to raise a large army to be sent into battle as one cohesive unit in a state of full battle preparedness for they believed that the decision to commit their forces should be made only after all factors had been weighed from the point of view of Polish political interests.
Towards the end of 1941, the Soviets demanded that part of the Polish force be sent to the front. The Poles countered with the claim that they had not yet completed battle training. As was their wont, the Soviets then applied a very material form of pressure: they issued orders limiting the rations and equipment to be supplied to General Anders' Armed Forces, and they also made it abundantly clear to the Poles that they would not tolerate for any length of time the continued existence on Soviet territory of a non-combatant army. An untenable situation was thus created, and both sides were constrained to find a solution. "The atmosphere at the time the evacuation lists were drawn up was such that even after it was explained to the Jews who bore responsibility for the harsh directives and why they were issued, they still did not believe the explanation.
The mood prevailing not only among the men but also among the officers of certain, types was near rejoicing over the prohibition to include members of the national minorities."
Hoffman also reports that he was told about one commanding officer who took pride in the fact that he did not include even one Jew in the list of evacuees he had prepared. ground and refused to put the names back on the list. Misztowt-Czyz also charges that this same Dudzinski removed fifty Jews from the evacuation train even though they had every right to be in the convoy. Misztowt-Czyz concludes that an injustice had been done to Polish citizens who were fully entitled to leave for Iran."
The liaison officer at staff headquarters, the engineer Andrzej Jenicz, drew up a comprehensive summary of the situation in which he included several suggestions of a political nature. He noted the fact that a large number of Jews could be found at those places where the lists of evacuees were being drawn up and where the potential evacuees had gathered. These Jews were incensed at the fact that their rights to be evacuated were being ignored while others were being brought from afar and included in the evacuation; Polish soldiers, on the other hand, were angry over the fact that the Jews seemed to be nearby while their own families were far away. Jenicz pointed out in his report that "the behavior of certain army personnel, who acted in an antiSemitic fashion during the evacuation, contributed to the creation of an ugly atmosphere;" he also pointed out that many of the Jews demonstrated "an aggressive and hostile" attitude. Jenicz described his efforts to have Jews included in the lists, and reported that in several cases he received support from non-military elements. However, his activities brought but meager results. Jenicz states clearly that "the evacuation of Jews from the Soviet Union was unpopular with the Polish public and army and was restricted to the barest minimum, in line with the position taken by the Soviet authorities."
Jenicz concluded his summary with the following comments:
"Circles in international Jewry will, of course, act upon the advice of our Jews who are embittered because so few were allowed to leave, and will put all the blame upon the Poles. As far as Polish state interests are concerned it is immaterial whether the blame is laid upon the civilian or the military -the Embassy, general headquarters or division staff. It is quite likely that the Soviet authorities will endeavour to portray the matter in a fashion unfavorable to Polish interests, and that they will do so in the context of the clash over the eastern territories. Soviet propaganda will claim that the Polish authorities did not want to take the Jews, and they will supply the Jews Some officers chose to behave in a brutally anti-Semitic manner, making the situation in fact harsher even than the stated policy, and only a few spoke out openly against the discrimination and sought to intervene to whatever extent they could.
It is very possible that the N.K.V.D., wanting to embroil the Poles, sought to utilize for their own propaganda purposes the unrestrained anti-Semitism which was rampant among them. However, we may also assume that even had those circumstances had no connection with the Soviet restrictive regulations, the Russians would hardly have allowed the Poles to carry out their machinations while attributing them to the Soviet authorities. Naturally, as in the earlier stages, those who suffered and were injured in all cases were the Jews.
Brief mention should be made at this point of the "desertion" of Jews from General Anders' Armed Forces, even though this is not the concern of this article and the topic merits a separate and independent study. While the force was stationed in Eretz Israel desertion from the ranks reached massive proper-tions. According to Anders, 3,000 out of 4,000 men deserted. We may assume that a prime motivation was the strong desire to become a part of the new Jewish community in Eretz Israel after the bitter experiences in the Soviet Union and in full awareness of events in occupied Poland. Furthermore, the anti-Semitism and discrimination in Anders' army during recruitment and later
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In his memoirs, and in declarations made elsewhere, Anders claimed to understand the motivations of those Jews who wanted to remain in Eretz Israel. For that reason he did not want to employ force in recovering deserters and did not even mount searches for them. This contention put forward by Anders years after the fact, while basically true, is not the whole truth. Anders 
